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Introduction
What are the major trends that have characterized the evolution of illicit drug traf-
ficking and organized crime (organized criminal networks) in the Americas over the
last quarter of a century? Which have been the principal transformations or adapta-
tions — economic, political and organizational — that have taken place within the
region’s vast illegal drug economy during first decade of the twenty first century?
This essay identifies eight key trends or patterns that typify the ongoing transforma-
tion of the drug trade and the organized criminal groups it has spawned as of
mid-2011. They are: (1) the increasing globalization of drug consumption; (2) the
limited or “partial victories” and unintended consequences of the US-led “War on
Drugs”, especially in the Andes; (3) the proliferation of areas of drug cultivation and
of drug smuggling routes throughout the hemisphere (so-called “balloon effects”);
(4) the dispersion and fragmentation of organized criminal groups or networks
within countries and across sub-regions (“cockroach effects”); (5) the failure of polit-
ical reform and state-building efforts (deinstitutionalization effects); (6) the inade-
quacies or failures of US domestic drug and crime control policies (demand control
failures); (7) the ineffectiveness of regional and international drug control policies
(regulatory failures); (8) the growth in support for harm reduction, decriminaliza-
tion and legalization policy alternatives (legalization debate).
The globalization of drug consumption
Many Latin American political leaders have long argued that if the US population did
not consume such large quantities of illegal drugs — if there were not so many Ameri-
can drug addicts and users — then Latin American and Caribbean countries would
not produce large quantities of illegal drugs like marijuana, cocaine, and heroin for ex-
port and the region would not be plagued by the powerful and well-financed drug
trafficking organizations — often called cartels — that have sprung up throughout the
hemisphere over the last twenty five years plus.1 It is certainly accurate to claim that
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1 The ex-presidents from Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, César Gavi-
ria, and Ernesto Zedillo respectively, highlight the necessity that the United States and Europe
should “design and implement policies leading to an effective reduction in their levels of drug
consumption and, as a consequence, in the overall scope of the narcotics criminal activities (La-
tin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, 2008: 7).
the United States has been for decades, and remains today, the largest single consumer
market for illicit drugs on the planet. Although there is no definitive estimate, the
value of all illicit drugs sold annually in the United States may reach as high as US $150
billion. Some $37 billion per year may be spent on cocaine alone (UNODC, 2010b:
5-6; 2011: 8).
Nonetheless, illegal drug use (and/or addiction) is not a uniquely “American”
disease, despite the title of David Musto’s pioneering book on the origins of drug con-
trol in the United States (David F. Musto, 1999). Over the last decade, the now-27 coun-
tries of the European Union have increased to 4.3 to 4.75 million cocaine users, which
represents 30% of the world-wide consumption in cocaine. The Europeans are almost
closing the gap with the approximately 5 million regular cocaine users found in the
United States.2 Indeed, levels of cocaine use in the United States have dropped steadily
since the early 1990s while cocaine consumption in Europe exploded exponentially
during the first decade of the twenty first century. In fact, the number of cocaine users
in the four EFTAand 27 EU countries doubled from 1998 through 2006.3 Moreover, the
Europeans pay more than twice as much per gram, ounce, kilo, or metric ton as do
American consumers. The UNODC 2011 report estimated that Americas combined
together consumed 63% of the 440 mt of cocaine available, while the European popula-
tion consumed 29% of the world supply. However, cocaine consumption in the US has
decreased by 40% from 1999 to 2009.4 The global heroin market is quite complicated in
terms of the supply chain. Afghanistan leads the world in heroin production, produc-
ing 380 mt or 83%. It has been estimated that Afghanistan produced 6,900 of opium in
2009 alone. With the exception of Latin America, the heroin produced from Afghani-
stan is trafficked to every major region around the world. Next, Myanmar produces
5%, while Mexico produces 9% of the heroin supply. The supply produced from Mex-
ico is trafficked to the US market. Colombia, on the other hand, only accounts for 1 mt,
which is approximately 0% of the world production of heroin. In terms of consump-
tion, the UNODC 2011 report estimates that Central and West Europe consumed 70 mt
of heroin alone in 2009. People residing in East Europe consumed even more heroin,
approximately 73 mt in 2009. Over the last decade or more, the bulk of the heroin con-
sumed in Europe has come from Afghanistan, whereas most of the heroin consumed
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2 UNODC (2011: 87). Note that the 5 million users of cocaine in the US are between the ages of 15 and 64.
3 Cocaine demand has been decreasing steadily in the US since 1982, from an estimated 10.5 milli-
on users in 1982 to some 5.3 in 2008. Cocaine users in the 27 European Union countries have, ho-
wever, more than doubled in the past decade, increasing from 2 million in 1998 to 4.1 million in
2008 (4.5 million in all of Europe). UNODC, (2010c: 16); also UNODC (2010b: v-vi and 82); the
consumption of cocaine has decreased in the US to 1.9% in 2009 to 2.5% in 2006. This information
came from the UNDOC (2011: 93).
4 Despite overall declines total area of coca leaf cultivation in the Andes, cocaine production re-
mained essentially stable from the mid-1990s through 2008 at approximately 800-1,100 mt.
North America, including Canada, accounted for some 40% of world-wide cocaine consumpti-
on. The EU and the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries consumed more than
25% of the world total. Together, these two regions accounted for more than 80% of the global co-
caine market, estimated at US$ 88 billion in 2008 (UNODC, 2010b: 82). In 2008, the total value of
worldwide cocaine and heroin markets combined was estimated at $US 153 billion (UNODC,
2010c: 19). These statistics are from the UNODC, World Drug Report (2011: 119).
in the United States comes from either Colombia (roughly 2% of word supply) or Mex-
ico (roughly 1.5% of world supply, UNODC, World Drug Report, 2011: 71-73). Co-
caine, in contrast, is produced in only three countries of the Western Hemisphere:
Colombia (45%), Peru (35-40%) and Bolivia (15-20%). Cocaine is trafficked from
these three Andean countries to 174 countries around the globe (see figure 1; also
UNODC, 2010b: 81-82).
Cocaine consumption is not limited only to advance capitalist markets such
as those of the United States and Europe.5 Cocaine use in Latin America has also
skyrocketed over the last decade. Indeed, Latin American consumers were in
2010 estimated to absorb some 200 metric tons of cocaine. Until 2009, Brazil was
considered to be the world’s second largest market for cocaine behind only the
United States.6 In the 2011 World Drug Report, the United Nations reports that
Brazil has replaced Argentina as the second biggest consumer of cocaine. The re-
port estimates that Brazil has 900,000 cocaine users, which makes it the number
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Figure 1 Major global cocaine flows, 2008 (*)
(*) UNODC (2010c: 70).
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5 Some 4.3-4.75 million people have used cocaine in Europe as of 2009 (UNODC, 2011: 86).
6 South America was the third largest consumer market for cocaine in the world in 2008 with some 2.4
million users. The bulk of South American consumption was concentrated in two countries of the
Southern Cone, although there was evidence of rising cocaine use in virtually every country in the
hemisphere. Given its population of nearly 200 million, Brazil had the largest number of users at
roughly 1 million. But use was most intense in Argentina, where an estimated 2.6% of the adult po-
pulation used cocaine in 2006 — a statistic roughly similar to that of the United States (UNODC,
2010b: 82).
one consumer in South America. Cocaine use in Argentina is reported to be 2.6%
and 2.4% in Chile (UNODC, 2011: 91). Cocaine consumption rates are quite high
in other regions of the world. In 2009, Africa had between 940.000 on the lower
end and 4.42 million cocaine users on the higher end. During the same year, Asia
has an estimated 400,000 cocaine users on the lower end and 2.3 million users on
the higher end. Eastern and South-Eastern Europe had less cocaine users in 2009
(310,000 on the lower end and 660,000 on the upper end; UNODC, 2011: 86). The
dramatic rises in European and South American cocaine consumption specifi-
cally have greatly expanded world market demand for this illicit Andean pro-
duct over the past decade. As a consequence, a pronounced trend toward the
proliferation of new global trafficking routes and the increased involvement of
criminal trafficking networks originating outside the Andean sub region became
increasingly evident.
Partial victories in the Andean war on drugs
From the middle of the nineteenth century through the mid-1980s, Peru and
Bolivia were the two principal country-suppliers of both coca leaf and of refined
cocaine to the US, European and other world markets (Paul Gootenberg, 2008:
1-14 and passim). As of 1985, Peru produced roughly 65% of the world’s supply
of coca leaf while Bolivia grew approximately 25% and Colombia 10% or less
(Bagley, 2009a: 25; Clawson and Lee III, 1998: 12-16). With the “partial victories”
achieved by the US-led war on drugs in the southern Andes during the late
1980s and early 1990s — specifically, US-financed crop eradication programs in
Bolivia’s Chapare under President Victor Paz Estensoro after 1986 (Operation
Blast Furnace) and Presidents Hugo Banzer/Jorge Quiroga from 1998 to 2002
(Plan Dignidad), along with Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori’s interruption
of the “air bridge” between the Alto Huallaga coca region in Peru and the clan-
destine cocaine laboratories located in Colombia in the mid-1990s, coca cultiva-
tion in the Andes rapidly shifted to Colombia in the mid- and late 1990s.7 By
2000, Colombia cultivated an estimated 90% of the world’s coca leaf while pro-
duction in Peru and Bolivia dwindled to historic lows (Bagley, 2009a: 29;
UNODC, 2006).
In the early 1990s, Colombia’s US-backed all-out war against drug lord Pablo
Escobar and the Medellin cartel during the César Gaviria administration lead to
Escobar’s death on December 2, 1993, and the rapid dissolution of the Medellín car-
tel (Dudley, 2004: 195-198; Vallejo, 2007: 352-385). Subsequent plea bargaining in
1994-95 during the Ernesto Samper administration with the major drug lords of
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7 After the Peru-Colombia “air bridge” that transported paste or base from Peru’s Alto Huallaga
to Colombia by small airplanes was disrupted by Peruvian President’s Fujimori’s adoption of a
shoot-down policy in 1993-94, the subsequent termination of the cocaine flights out of Peru du-
ring the Fujimori dictatorship in the mid-late 1990s, and the launching of Plan Dignidad in 1998
(with US Government funding) by the newly-installed Banzer government in Bolivia, the
the Cali cartel, specifically the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers, catalyzed the dis-
mantling of the Cali cartel.8 While some large criminal trafficking networks (e.g.,
the Cartel del Norte del Valle), continued to operate in Colombia in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, some 300 plus smaller drug trafficking organizations (known as
cartelitos) surfaced to fill the vacuum left by the dismantling of the two major
cartels in the political economy of Colombia’s still highly profitable drug trade.
By the late 1990s, basically as an unanticipated and unintended consequence of
the demise of the country’s major cartels, Colombia’s leftwing Fuerzas Ar-
madas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia, or FARC) guerrillas and rightwing Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC) paramilitary militias took
control of coca cultivation and processing throughout rural Colombia, precipi-
tating increased drug-related violence between these two groups of armed ille-
gal actors, each of whom sought to eliminate the other and to consolidate their
own territorial control over drug cultivation regions and the peasant growers
across the Colombian countryside (Bagley, 2009a: 28-29).
As a direct result, levels of drug-fueled violence in Colombia spiraled out of con-
trol in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Indeed, during much of the first decade of the
2000s Colombia became one of the most dangerous and violent countries in the world.
In July 2000, President Clinton and the US government responded by backing the
Andrés Pastrana administration in its war against run away drug production and traf-
ficking in Colombia via the adoption of Plan Colombia. In August 2002, the newly in-
augurated government of Álvaro Uribe received additional drug war assistance from
Washington and the George W. Bush administration in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on the United States. Supported by almost $8 billion in US aid under Plan Co-
lombia over the course of a decade, by 2010 Colombian President Uribe and his pro-
gram of “democratic security” had managed to beat back the FARC guerrillas,
demobilize many — if not all — of the country’s paramilitary bands, and substantially
reduce the country’s astronomically high levels of drug-related violence.9
Despite the substantial achievements of Plan Colombia and the Uribe admin-
istration’s “democratic security” policies, however, as of 2010 Colombia remained
a principal source of coca leaf and refined cocaine in the Andes and drug-related vi-
olence and criminality appeared to be once again on the rise. The 2011 UN Drug
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epicenter of illegal coca cultivation shifted from Eastern Peru and Bolivia to southeastern Co-
lombia. Gootenberg (2008: 291-324); Clawson and Lee III (1998: 16-21); Francisco E. Thoumi
(2003: 7 and passim).
8 By September 1996, after allegations that the Cali Cartel financed Ernesto Samper’s presidential
campaign had surfaced in 1994, the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers and other major the Cali cartel
leaders had been imprisoned in Colombia. See Maria Clemencia Ramirez Lemus, Kimberly
Stanton and John Walsh (2005); also Camilo Chaparro (2005: 125-148). Fernando Rodríguez
Mondragón y Antonio Sánchez (2007: 169-173).
9 On the paramilitary demobilization, see Elvira María Restrepo and Bruce Bagley (2011). The
Uribe Government emphasized a counterinsurgency strategy in Plan Colombia, an important
difference from the Pastrana government’s original “Plan Marshall”. During 2002-2003 Uribe
increased the number of combat troops and pursued constitutional reforms to expand the mili-
tary activities (Ramírez Lemus, Stanton and John Walsh, 2005: 111-112).
Report states that the area used for cultivating coca in Colombia decreased by an
estimated 15% in 2010, leaving Colombia just a slightly ahead of Peru as the
world’s largest coca leaf producer. Currently, the area under cultivation in Colom-
bia is estimated at 62,000 ha. In comparison, 2009 statistics report 73,000 ha in terms
of area under cultivation.10 As an unintended consequence of the US-backed war
on drugs in Colombia, the locus of organized criminal involvement in cocaine traf-
ficking gradually shifted northwards from Colombia to Mexico. As the Uribe ad-
ministration and the US-backed Plan Colombia succeeded at least partially in
Colombia in the war against cocaine traffickers, the major drug trafficking net-
works in Mexico took advantage of the vacuum left in the drug trade to take over
control of cocaine smuggling operations from Colombia into the United States. As
a consequence, drug-related violence and criminality shifted northwards into
Mexican territory as various Mexican trafficking organizations vied for control
over the highly lucrative smuggling trade from Colombia and the southern Andes
into the large and profitable US market.11
Thus, Mexico’s current drug-related bloodbath is, in part, directly attribut-
able to the partial victory in the war on drugs achieved in Colombia in recent years
via Plan Colombia. If the US-backed Mérida Initiative presently being imple-
mented in Mexico achieves results similar to those of Plan Colombia, it will not halt
drug trafficking or end organized crime in Mexico or the region. The most likely
outcome is that it will drive both further underground in Mexico while pushing
many smuggling activities and criminal network operations into neighboring
countries such as Guatemala and Honduras and back to Colombia and the Andes.
Indeed, evidence that some Mexican drug trafficking operations (Sinaloa, Zetas)
are moving from Mexico into Central America is already abundant.12
Proliferation of areas of cultivation and smuggling routes
(the balloon effect)
The 2010 World Drug Report indicates that Colombia successfully reduced the to-
tal number of hectares under coca cultivation within its national territory in the
second half of the 2000s, although production has still not returned to pre-2000
levels. How large the reductions in Colombian coca cultivation in the past three
years have actually been is a controversial topic, plagued by inadequate data,
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10 The 62,000 ha and 73,000 ha includes in the calculation small fields (UNODC, 2011: 100-111;
Isacson, 2010).
11 Bagley (2011: 31). The US government estimates that the Mexican cartels make $19 to 39 billion
annually from the drug trade. Drug policy analyst Dr. Peter Reuter estimates Mexican cartel
drug profits at the much lower figure of $7 billion per year for 2010. Even at Reuter’s lower esti-
mate level, the profits remain quite substantial and are certainly enough to spur on the intense
violence Mexican drug traffickers have exhibited in recent years (Kilmer et al., 2010).
12 The Northern Triangle countries of Central America — Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador
— have been deeply affected. The intense drug-related violence presents serious challenges to
governance (UNODC, 2010c: 26).
methodological problems, and major uncertainties regarding the actual extent of
cultivation and yield levels. Given similar caveats, coca cultivation in both Peru
and Bolivia, after almost two decades of decline, appears once again to have ex-
panded.13 Most observers believe that overall coca leaf production and cocaine
availability in the Andean region remain roughly on par with 2000 levels and well
above those of 1990 or 1995. Evidently, the balloon effect that allowed coca cultiva-
tion to shift north from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia in the 1990s continues to op-
erate as cultivation moved back into Peru and Bolivia from Colombia at the end of
the first decade of the 2000s. Various observers have speculated about the possibil-
ity that the tropical variety of coca — known in Portuguese as Epadu — might well
balloon coca cultivation from its traditional growing areas on the eastern slopes
of the Andes into Brazil and elsewhere in the Amazon basin in coming years, if
ongoing or renewed eradication efforts prove successful in Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia.
The 2010 UN report registered a 10-20% decline in coca production in Colom-
bia from 2008 to 2009.14 But enthusiasm regarding such statistics should be tem-
pered by realism. First, it is important to note that year-to-year variations are
commonplace owing to climate factors and short-term disruptions; declines over
several years are required to identify enduring trends. Second, the UN statistics are
approximations along a range rather than firm data points; it is entirely possible
that the 2010 UN report underestimate the real levels of production. Third, innova-
tions in more productive hybrid plants, yields-per-hectare and processing can pro-
duce higher levels of refined cocaine production than anticipated by the UN
analysts. Finally, the ongoing decentralization and dispersion of cultivation in Co-
lombia makes accurate mapping of the total numbers of hectares under cultivation
a very problematic endeavor.15
Such caveats aside, the key reason that Colombia appears to have experi-
enced a significant decline in coca production in 2008 and 2009 is that the Uribe
government moved away from its almost exclusive (US-backed) reliance on aerial
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13 From 2009 to 2010, the area under cultivation increased in Peru by 2%. In terms of hectares, the
estimates for 2010 are 61,200. Cultivation has varied in Peru based on region. Some smaller regi-
ons located in the Amazon Basin saw dramatic increases, as much as 90%, in terms of the area
under cultivation. It is important to note that cocaine production in Peru has been increasing
ever since 2005, according the UN Report. On the hand, Colombia saw a decrease in production
in 2010; the 2010 estimate for production is 350 mt. For more information, see UNODC (2011:
101). Between 2000 and 2009 coca cultivation increased by 38% and 112% in Peru and Bolivia,
respectively (UNODC, 2010c: 65). Coca cultivation is, in short, returning to countries where era-
dication policies damaged the reputation of the US and US drug control policies and incentivi-
zed peasant unrest (Gootenberg, 2008: 315).
14 In 2008 Colombia produced 450 mt of cocaine, out of a UN estimated 865 mt worldwide produc-
tion. US government estimates of total cocaine production were higher, ranging up to 1000 mt.
Regarding cultivation, there was a decrease in hectares cultivated from around 80,000 to 68,000
in 2008-2009 in Colombia according to the UNODC, World Drug Report (2010c: 66). Estimates of
cocaine production per hectare of cultivated coca are quite unreliable.
15 For a discussion in historical perspective of the difficulties of quantifying cocaine production,
see Gootenberg (2008: 325-336); for a discussion of the difficulties with the UNODC estimates,
see Francisco E. Thoumi (2010); Francisco E. Thoumi and Ernestine Jensema (2004).
spraying to a more effective mixture of spraying and manual eradication linked to
comprehensive alternative development programs in key coca growing areas such
as La Macarena. As a consequence of the weakening of FARC control in vast
stretches of rural Colombia and the partial demobilization of the paramilitary
bands engaged in drug trafficking over the period 2002-2007, 2008-2009 marked
the beginning of an important decline after at least three years of steady increases
in total production. To sustain this decline will certainly require that Colombia
continue its manual eradication efforts and that it provide additional funds for
well-designed and executed alternative development programs in coca growing
areas throughout the country (Youngers and Walsh, 2010; also Felbab-Brown et
al., 2009; US GAO, 2008; Isacson and Poe, 2009).
Meanwhile, recent increases in coca cultivation in both Peru and Bolivia
suggest that the focus of US attention and resources on Colombia has led to the
neglect of coca cultivation in those traditional coca growing countries in the
central Andes. To forestall a recurrence of the balloon effect — pushing cultiva-
tion out of one country only to have it reappear in others — the Obama adminis-
tration will have to seek to reestablish a workable relation with the government
of President Evo Morales in Bolivia and find effective ways to combat the resur-
gence of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and coca cultivation in Peru. Failure
to achieve more effective drug control policies in both countries will likely re-
sult in a continuing shift of coca production back to Peru and Bolivia, thereby
nullifying any real progress made in reducing coca cultivation in Colombia over
the medium term.16
In the 1980s, largely as a result of the formation of the US government’s
South Florida Task Force in 1982 — headed by then-Vice President George H. W.
Bush — the established Caribbean routes used by the Medellín and Cali cartels in
the 1970s and early 1980s were essentially closed down by American law enforce-
ment and military operations. They were quickly replaced over the mid to late
1980s and early 1990s with new routes that used Panama and Central America,
the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Corridor to reach Mexico and then cross from
Mexico into United States (Bagley, 2011; Scott and Marshall, 1998: 186-192). When
the Mexican cartels took over from Medellín and Cali in the late 1990s, the Pacific
Corridor became the principal smuggling route northwards from Colombia to
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16 UNODC (2010a). “If the current trend continues, Peru will soon overtake Colombia as the
world’s biggest coca producer — a notorious status that it has not had since the mid-1990s”, said
UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa. Coca cultivation in Peru increased 6.8% in
2009 — from 56,100 hectares in 2008 to 59,900. Cultivation of coca in Colombia, however, decrea-
sed in 2009 by 16% — from 81,000 hectares in 2008 to 68,000 hectares in 2009. Despite Colombia’s
apparent decline, overall coca cultivation in the Andean region decreased only 5.2% in 2009.
According to the UNODC data, cultivation of coca in Bolivia barely changed between 2008 and
2009, increasing only by 400 hectares (about 1% — from 30,500 hectares in 2008 to 30,900 in
2009). This UNODC report contradicted the US estimate for Bolivia, which showed a 9.4% incre-
ase in cultivation between 2008 and 2009 (and a 2009 cultivation estimate that is 4,100 hectares
higher than the UNODC’s estimate). See Just the Facts. A Civilian’s Guide to US Defense and Secu-
rity Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, June 23, 2010, http://justf.org
the United States, although the Gulf route also remained active.17 From December
1, 2006, onward Mexican President Felipe Calderón, with Washington’s active as-
sistance since 2008 via the Mérida Initiative, has waged an intense military cam-
paign against Mexico major drug cartels.18 Although not by any means successful
in eliminating Mexico key drug trafficking groups as of 2010, Calderón’s
militarization of the drug war has unquestionably made smuggling across the
US-Mexican border from Mexico more dangerous and expensive than in past
years. As a result, some of the Mexican trafficking organizations have begun to
move into Central America — especially Guatemala and Honduras — to take ad-
vantage of these much weaker states to conduct their smuggling operations
(Bagley, 2011; Farah, 2011; ICG, 2011: 3; Dudley, 2011 ).
There is also abundant evidence indicating increased use of both Venezuelan
and Ecuadoran territory by Colombian traffickers to replace the increasingly prob-
lematic Mexico routes. Venezuela is a jumping off point for smuggling through the
Caribbean to the east coast of the United States or across the Atlantic through West
Africa into Europe. Venezuela also is used for drug flights into Honduras or Guate-
mala where the shipments are then transferred to trucks and transported by land
across the Guatemalan-Mexican border northwards to the United States.19
The balloon effects produced by the partial victories in the war on drugs in
the Andes on both drug cultivation and drug smuggling routes are evident. Over
the past twenty five years and more, the war on drugs conducted by the United
States and its various Latin American and Caribbean allies has succeeded repeat-
edly in shifting coca cultivation from one area to another in the Andes and in forc-
ing frequent changes in smuggling routes. But it has proven unable to disrupt
seriously, much less stop permanently, either production or trafficking in the hemi-
sphere. The traffickers constant, successful adaptations to law enforcement mea-
sures designed to end their activities have lead to the progressive contamination of
more and more countries in the region by the drug trade and its attendant criminal-
ity and violence (Archibald and Cave, 2011).
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17 This displacement is also confirmed by the fact that Mexican criminal organizations have incre-
ased their activities in the US. By 2008 these organizations had presence in 230 US cities while
three years before they were present in only 100 cities. Moreover, the Colombian groups now
controlled the illicit cocaine and heroin distribution in only 40 cities, mostly in the north-east
(UNODC, 2010c: 79).
18 On Calderon’s military strategy and the Mérida Initiative, see Rafael Velázquez Flores and Juan
Pablo Prado Lallande (2009), Raul Benitez Manaut (2010), David A. Shirk (2011).
19 Between 2006 and 2008, over half the maritime shipments of cocaine to Europe detected came
from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Ecuador has also been affected by an increase in
transit trafficking, and both countries are experiencing increasing problems with violence
(UNODC, 2010c: 30).
Dispersion and fragmentations of criminal drug trafficking
organizations (the cockroach effect)
The differential insertion of individual countries into the political economy of
drug trafficking in the hemisphere has produced a variety of forms or types of in-
termediation between peasant growers of illicit crops and consumers. In Bolivia,
the presence of peasant cooperatives in the countryside since the Movimiento
Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement, or MNR) revolu-
tion of 1952 produced coca grower associations and generally inhibited the rise
of either criminal organizations or guerrilla movements as intermediaries, al-
though the Bolivian military itself has on various occasions fulfilled this role.20 In
Peru, the absence of strong grass roots associations among peasant growers opened
the way for both elements of the country’s military apparatus (led by intelligence chief
Vladimiro Montesinos) and guerrilla organizations (Sendero Luminoso) to perform
the role of intermediaries or traffickers.21 In Colombia, the absence of both peasant or-
ganizations and military intermediaries paved the way for the rise of major criminal
organizations such as the Medellín and Cali cartels to fill the role. The demise of the
major cartels opened the way for illegal armed actors such as the FARC and the
paramilitaries.22 In Mexico and Central America, elements of the military and/or po-
lice have sometimes performed the functions of intermediation in previous decades,
but in the 1990s and 2000s these countries have followed the Colombian pattern of
criminal intermediation owing to the absence strong grower associations (Thoumi,
2003: 159-264; Healy, 1988; ICG, 2005).
In terms of criminal organizations or criminal trafficking networks, Co-
lombia and Mexico provide the two most important examples over the last
twenty five years. In Colombia, the rise and fall of Medellin and Cali (and subse-
quently the Norte del Valle cartel) vividly illustrate the perils and vulnerabili-
ties of large, hierarchical criminal trafficking organizations, especially when
they attempt to confront the state openly. Both major cartels in Colombia were
hierarchically structured and proved to be vulnerable targets for Colombian
and international law enforcement agencies. In the wake of Medellin and Cali,
Colombia witnessed a rapid fragmentation and dispersion of criminal net-
works that have proven far more difficult for law enforcement authorities to
track down and dismantle than their larger and more notorious predecessors
(Garzón, 2008; Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and León-Beltrán, 2010). Al-
though there may be counter-tendencies leading to re-concentration among
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20 In Bolivia, coca growing peasants joi relatively peaceful (Gootenberg, 2008: 313).
21 In Peru, the eradication policy caused discontent and rejection among the peasants and favored
the growth of the Shining Path. Thus, the guerrillas took control of particular areas, forcing local
authorities to resign and flee while the guerrilla leadership demanded payments for processing
and transporting the drug. Intense eradication actions without economic alternatives made pe-
ople join the guerrillas (Valderrama and Cabieses, 2004: 60-61).
22 This collapse of Colombia’s two major cartels opened the way for new actors to assume expan-
ded roles in the drug industry, particularly paramilitary and guerrilla organizations that use the
illegal drugs to fund their activities (Thoumi, 2004: 76).
criminal trafficking organizations in Colombia today (e.g., los Rastrojos, las
Águilas Negras), the basic lesson to emerge from Colombia appears to be that
smaller criminal networks are less vulnerable to law enforcement and state re-
pression. Colombia’s emergent Bandas Criminales (Bacrim), the descendants of
the now formally demobilized paramilitary groups that made up the Colom-
bian Sell-Defense Forces (Auto Defensas Unidas de Colombia — AUC) repre-
sent a new generation of drug traffickers in Colombia. They differ from the
“paras” in several important respects: (1) they tend to be politically much more
deft and subtle in seeking political alliances inside the Colombian economic and
political establishment, often hiding their political linkages through indirect
contacts and “clean” candidates without records of paramilitary affiliations or
ties in the past; (2) they focus on establishing political influence at the municipal
and departmental (provincial) levels rather than the national level; (3) the locus
of their activities includes not only Colombia’s Caribbean coast but also the Pa-
cific southwest; and (4) they have expanded their economic interests beyond
drug trafficking to include other illegal activities (land piracy, gold mining, tim-
ber) as well as legal enterprises. From the Colombian state’s perspective, such
organizations are, at least to date, far less threatening because they do not have
the capacity to threaten state security directly (Pachico, 2011a).
In Mexico, as in Colombia in the 1980s and early 1990s, cocaine profits appear
to have energized the country’s major criminal networks and unleashed a wave of
violence among criminal organizations seeking to strengthen and consolidate their
control of key smuggling routes. As of 2011, this struggle was still playing itself out
in brutal and bloody fashion. Nonetheless, Mexico’s criminal trafficking groups do
appear to be gradually following the Colombian pattern of dispersion and frag-
mentation, although the evidence is not yet conclusive. In 2000, the Tijuana cartel
(Arrellano Félix family) and the Juárez cartel (Carrillo Fuentes family) were the
two largest and most dominant drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. Since
2000, after the Vicente Fox administration first went after Tijuana and then Juárez,
Mexico has seen the rise of at least five new major trafficking organizations
and a host of smaller, lesser known groups: Sinaloa, Gulf, Familia Michocana,
Beltrán-Leyva, and Zetas.23 This dispersion of criminal networks in Mexico may
well represent the beginning of the kind of fragmentation observed in Colombia in
the 1990s. If it does, the trend would be warmly welcomed by Mexican governing
authorities because it would portend a considerable diminution in the capacity of
organized criminal networks in Mexico to directly challenge state authority and
national security.
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23 Luis Astorga Almanza (2007), Luis Astorga Almanza and David A. Shirk (2010). From 1995 on-
ward several Mexican cartels became progressively more involved in cocaine traffic out of Co-
lombia. The Tijuana and Juarez cartels started to fight for control of cocaine smuggling routes
across Mexico and cross-border plazas into the United States in the vacuum left by the collapse
of the major Colombian cartels. Only after 2000, however, did Mexico experience the rise and
participation of newer cartels such as Sinaloa, the Gulf, and the Zetas (Bagley and Hernández,
2010: 332-333).
A key reason that some analysts do not accept the fragmentation of orga-
nized crime thesis in contemporary Mexico relates directly to the emergence of
a new criminal network model — the Sinaloa cartel. Unlike its predecessors and
current rivals in Mexico, the Sinaloa cartel is less hierarchical and more
federative (hub and spokes) in its organizational structure. Its principal leader,
Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera has forged a new type of “federation” that
gives greater autonomy (and profits) to affiliated groups. To date, Sinaloa, also
known as the Federation, seems to be winning the war against its rivals, al-
though its fight against the Zetas (a paramilitary-style organization) is proving
to be prolonged, costly, and bloody. It is likely that the Sinaloa model will prove
more sustainable — better for business — than other criminal trafficker organi-
zational models in Mexico, but the jury is still out (Flores Pérez, 2009: 137-228;
Chabat, 2010; Williams, 2010).
The escalating urban gang wars in Medellín, Colombia’s Comuna 13
neighborhood exemplify the kinds of violent internecine conflicts taking place
over many contested drug trafficking areas and routes across the entire Latin
American region (e.g., the states of Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Michoacán and
Tamaulipas in Mexico, the Pacific coast of Guatemala, the Valle de Cauca
Department near Cali, Colombia, the municipality of Caucasia in Colombia,
or the favelas of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil). In Medellín, literally scores of
relatively small, competing drug gangs have generated a pattern of “disorga-









Juárez Cartel Juárez Cartel Juárez Cartel
Tijuana Cartel
Tijuana Cartel Tijuana Cartel
“El Teo” Faction “El Teo” Faction
Golfo Cartel Golfo-Zetas Cartel
Golfo Cartel
Zetas Cartel
La Familia Michoacana La Familia Michoacana La Familia Michoacana
Milenio Cartel Milenio Cartel
La Resistencia
Jalisco Cartel-Nueva Generación
6 organizations 8 organizations 12 organizations
(*) Table elaborated by the author based on personal interviews in Mexico in 2011.
Table 1 Proliferation of Mexican Cartels, 2006-2010(*)
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keeping murder rates low and police attention to a minimum — the criminal
world is in turmoil and in need of an arbitrator to re-establish authority”
(Pachico, 2011b: s.p.).
Like Mexico, where the splintering of authority has led to the creation of
smaller but no less violent groups such as the Cartel de Acapulco and Mano
con Ojos, Colombia’s drug gangs are fighting to establish their place in the
new criminal hierarchy in Medellin’s poor and marginalized barrios long ig-
nored by both the central Colombian state in Bogotá and by Medellín’s munici-
pal government. Under former mayor (now governor of Antioquia) Sergio
Fajardo, Medellin did see a significant decline in violence rates for several years
— especially homicide statistics — via informal negotiations with the gangs,
new mayoral initiatives to reduce gang violence (e.g., increased social services,
expanded educational opportunities, jobs programs, new public recreational
spaces for youth) and the demobilization of the nation’s paramilitary groups in
2005 and beyond. The relative peace achieved by the Fajardo administration in
Medellin and the successor mayoral administration of Alonso Salazar, did, un-
fortunately, gradually give way to renewed violence in Medellin’s Comuna 13
and other urban neighbourhoods where drug trafficking and Bacrim activity
resurged in 2010 and 2011. Medellin’s Comuna 13 or Ciudad Juarez’s Rivera del
Bravo slums are perfect launching platforms for gang warfare. In such neigh-
bourhoods, drug traffickers have found readily accessible pools of new gang
members and many potential drug consumers, as well as efficient corridors for
smuggling drugs and arms. In Comuna 13, the violence is mainly about control-
ling the San Juan highway, which leads out of the city to northern Antioquia and
Urabá on Colombia’s northern Caribbean coast. The gangs that control the high-
way decide who and what enter and leave Medellín: drugs, guns, money. The
armed group established by former Medellín capo Pablo Escobar, now known
as “the Office”, remains the largest and most powerful criminal network in
Medellín, even though it has splintered into rival factions and neither side has
yet managed to achieve control over Comuna 13 and the San Juan transit route
(ibid).
The maras (youth gangs) in Central American countries such as Honduras
and Guatemala, the Barrio Azteca prison gang in El Paso, Texas, and Juárez, Me-
xico, and the Comando Vermelho in Rio de Janeiro provide additional examples
of the proliferation of gangs or pandillas that work and fight — often in close as-
sociation with major cartels — that have appeared along with the phenomenon
of fragmentation and dispersion. In 2004, for example, the armed wing of the
Juárez Cartel — La Línea — started to attack the local police openly while em-
ploying the cobro de piso (right-of-way tax) to transit drug shipments through
Chihuahua. This was possible owing to the incorporation of former police offi-
cials from Juárez into the ranks of the Juárez cartel. Following the intromission
of the Sinaloa Cartel into Juárez in the mid-2000s, rising levels of violence and
murder involving Los Aztecas, a gang affiliated with La Línea, against oppositi-
on gangs such as the Mexicles, the Artistas Asesinos (Artistic Assassins) and the
Gente Nueva (new youth gangs) have been the order of the day in Juárez, the
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murder capital of Mexico (Dávila, 2010; Bowden, 2010). By October 2005, there
were also an estimated 17,000 gang members that belong to the Mara Salvatru-
cha or MS-13 and the 18th Street operating in Ciudad Juárez, (Gereben Schaefer,
Bahney and Riley, 2009). While no recent statistics are available, anecdotal evi-
dence indicates that the numbers of maras active in Juarez and Mexico more ge-
nerally appear to have increased steadily to above 25,000.
As in the Colombian case during the 1980s and 1990s, paramilitary groups
have also surfaced in recent years in Juárez, Monterrey and other parts of Mexico in
response to the cartels and affiliated gang violence. The appearance of these para-
military bands highlights the weak law enforcement capacities of the Mexican gov-
ernment and its perceived inability to effectively confront and defeat the country’s
powerful drug trafficking organizations.24
Under pressure from Mexican and US law enforcement, Mexican trafficker
organizations have, since the mid-2000s if not before, sought to move at least part
of their smuggling operations from Mexico into neighboring countries. Guatemala
and Honduras are currently targets for both the Sinaloa Cartel and the Zetas.25 The
upsurge in drug-related violence in both of these Central American nations is
closely related to these shifts in operational bases. This trend, observable through-
out the hemisphere, is sometimes labeled the “cockroach” effect, because it is remi-
niscent of the scurrying of cockroaches out of a dirty kitchen into other places to
avoid detection after a light has been turned on them. Closely linked to the “bal-
loon” effect, the “cockroach” effect refers specifically to the displacement of crimi-
nal networks from one city/state/region to another within a given country or from
one country to another in search of safer havens and more pliable state authorities.
Failure of political reform or state building
(the deinstitutionalization effect)
States determine the form or type of organized crime that can operate and flour-
ish with a given national territory. Criminal organizations, in contrast, do not de-
termine the type of state, although they certainly can deter or inhibit political
reform efforts at all levels of a political system from local to national. Advanced
capitalist democracies — from the United States to Europe to Japan — exhibit
wide variations in the types of organized crime that they generate and/or tolerate.
The United States, for example, has eliminated the Italian mafia model and seen it
replaced by fragmented and widely dispersed domestic criminal organizations,
many affiliated with immigrant communities. Europe is characterized by a simi-
lar evolution of organized crime groups affiliated with immigrant populations.
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24 See http://www.elpasotimes.com/newupdated/ci_17627581; also George W. Grayson (2009);
Hal Brands (2009).
25 On March 11, 2011, Honduran officials reported that they had for the first time dismantled a co-
caine lab that belonged to the Zetas. This highlights the changing location activities of Zetas due
to the pressure they are feeling elsewhere (Stratfor, 2010a).
Japan, in contrast, has coexisted with the Yakuza, a more corporate-style criminal
network. In China, state capitalism coexists with the Chinese triads and other
criminal organizations. In Russia, the Putin government, in effect, subordinated
and incorporated various elements of the Russian mafia as para-state organiza-
tions (Bagley, 2004).
In Colombia, the paramilitary organizations, deeply involved in drug traf-
ficking, were linked directly to both state institutions and to specific political par-
ties. In Mexico, the formerly dominant PRI party developed almost tributary
relations with organized crime groups. When the PRI’s almost 71-year monopoly
over political power was broken at the national level in 2000 by the victory of PAN
presidential candidate Vicente Fox, the old lines of tribute/bribery broke down as
well and unleashed a wave of internecine violence among trafficking organiza-
tions as they struggled among themselves for control of cocaine transit through
their country (Bagley and Hernández, 2010: 332).
Transitions from authoritarian regimes to more open and democratic forms
of governance in Latin America, as in Russia and Eastern Europe, are particularly
problematic, because the old, authoritarian institutional controls often collapse or
are swept away but cannot be easily or quickly replaced by new, democratic forms
of control, at least in the short term. Mexico is experiencing precisely such a transi-
tion. The old institutions — police, courts, prisons, intelligence agencies, parties,
elections — no longer work. Indeed, they are manifestly corrupt and dysfunc-
tional. Nevertheless, in practice, few new institutional mechanisms have arisen to
replace them. Moreover, reform efforts can be, and often have been, stymied or de-
railed entirely by institutional corruption and criminal violence intended to limit
or undermine state authority and the rule of law. There certainly are significant in-
stitutional reforms proposed or underway in México at the end of the Felipe
Calderon sexenio (2006-12), but there is little question that such reforms have not
come fast enough nor have they been deep enough to date to contain drug traffick-
ing criminal organizations and related violence and corruption in México.
Such observations do not constitute arguments against democratization.
Rather, they highlight challenges and obstacles along the road to democratization
that are frequently overlooked or ignored altogether. Democratic theorists have
only recently begun to seriously examine the problems for democratic transitions
that emanate from organized and entrenched criminal networks. In the countries
of Latin America and the Caribbean, such neglect of institution reform may well
imperil both political stability and democracy itself. Rather than democratic con-
solidation, the consequence of ignoring organized crime and its corrosive effects
may well be institutional decay or democratic de-institutionalization. Countries
emerging from internal armed conflicts are significantly more vulnerable, al-
though such conflicts are not the only source of institutional weakness. Transitions
from authoritarian to democratic political systems may also engender such institu-
tional deficits even in the absence of prior prolonged internal conflict.
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The inflexibility and ineffectiveness of regional and international
drug control policies (regulatory failures)
Reflecting the hegemonic influence of the United States over international drug
policy during the post-World War II period, the United Nations (UN) Organiza-
tion of Drug Control (UNODC) and the Organization of American States (OAS)
have both faithfully reproduced the US prohibitionist regime at the multilateral
level. The UN’s approach to drug control (like that of the OAS) severely limits
the flexibility of responses at the level of member-states because it effectively
rules out any possible experimentation with legalization and/or decriminaliza-
tion. Both the UN and the OAS part from the assumption that all illicit drugs are
“evil” and must be prohibited and suppressed. In practice, the UN-OAS-US un-
wavering prohibitionist strategy has dominated international discourse on
drug control and prevented individual countries from experimenting with
alternative approaches (or forced them to ignore or defy their UN treaty obliga-
tions regarding narcotics control; see Thoumi, 2010; Global Commission on
Drug Policy, 2011).
For example, both the UN, the OAS and the US have, in effect, systematically
rejected Bolivian President Evo Morales’ declared policy of fostering traditional
and commercial uses of legally grown coca leaf while prevent the processing of
coca leaf into cocaine in that country. It must, of course, be recognized that coca cul-
tivation in Bolivia did rise significantly in subsequent years beyond the amount
that was necessary to supply traditional or ceremonial purposes and even “legal”
non-cocaine uses. Similarly, both the US federal government and the UN opposed
the November 2010 California ballot initiative that sought (and failed) to legalize
marijuana cultivation and commercialization in that state. It is entirely possible
that, had the California Proposition 19 initiative on marijuana been approved by
the state’s voters, it would have run afoul of both US federal statutes and America’s
UN treaty obligations.
In practice, the UN prohibitionist inclination has meant that there is little
or no international backing for options other than the current “war on drugs, ”
no matter what collateral damage is incurred in the process. The ten-year
UN drug policy review of international drug control policies (1998-2008) pre-
dictably concluded that the current prohibitionist UN policies in place were the
best and only real strategic option available moving forward and generated no
significant alterations in international drug control policies and practices, de-
spite growing doubts and questioning among some member states and many
independent analysts (Pardo, 2010).
The failure of US drug control policies
While the United States has managed to stabilize or even reduce demand for most
illicit drugs at home, it most certainly has not eliminated American demand for il-
licit drugs or the profits associated with supplying the huge US market. Demand
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control has routinely been underfunded by Washington while primary emphasis
has almost automatically been accorded to expensive, but ultimately ineffective,
supply-side control strategies. There have been some efforts since 2009 undertaken
by the Obama administration, and his Drug Czar Gil Kerlikowske, to redress this
long-standing imbalance in US drug policy, although prevention and treatment re-
main woefully underfunded. Analysis of the reasons behind the US insistence on
supply over demand control strategies lies beyond the scope of this essay.
The consequences of Washington’s strategic choices are, however, obvious.
Washington has demanded that the countries of the region follow its lead in the
war on drugs and, as in previous years, upheld a formal “certification” process that
often sanctioned those nations that did not “fully cooperate”. US insistence on such
a policy approach has not only led to overall failure in the war on drugs over the
last twenty five years plus, it has been counterproductive for both US and individ-
ual Latin American country interests. The price that Colombia has paid for its role
in the war on drugs has been high in both blood and treasure. The price that Mexico
is being asked to pay today is as high or higher. The high costs associated with fail-
ure have generated a reaction to the US strategy both at home and abroad and pro-
duced a new debate over alternatives to American prohibitionist approaches such
as harm reduction, decriminalization, and legalization (Bagley and Tokatlian,
2007; Bagley, 2009b; 1988).
The search for alternatives: the debate over legalization,
decriminalization, and harm reduction
Some Latin American analysts anticipated that the possible passage of California’s
Proposition 19 in November 2010, which sought to legalize the cultivation, distribu-
tion and possession of marijuana in the state, would signal the beginning of the end of
the US-led war on drugs and allow Mexico and other countries in the region to move
away from the “prohibitionist” strategy that has generated so much drug-related vio-
lence throughout Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. Many Latin Amer-
ican political leaders, however, openly oppose the legalization of marijuana in
California and stridently argue against the legalization or decriminalization of
harder drugs in the USA and around the globe. In the end, Proposition 19 was de-
feated at the polls by a 52% against versus almost 48% in favor among California vot-
ers. Undeterred, proponents of marijuana legalization in California are likely place
another Prop-19 style initiative on the California ballot in November 2012 with the
hope that a larger turn out among under 30 voters in a presidential year.
Whether one did or does favor marijuana legalization in California and be-
yond, there are many reasons to be skeptical of the real impact of marijuana le-
galization on drug trafficking and organized crime in California or anywhere
else. First, even if such an initiative is ultimately approved in some American
states, there are likely to be US federal government challenges that could delay
implementation of any such new state laws for years. Second, legalization of
marijuana, if and when it ever occurs, will not address the issues — production,
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processing, trafficking and distribution — raised by criminal activity, violence
and corruption spawned by traffic in harder drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and
methamphetamines among other. Criminal gangs in Mexico and elsewhere in
the hemisphere will most likely move away from marijuana to deeper involve-
ment in the still-illegal drugs, organized crime and drug-related violence will
continue. In the long run, as the 2011 Global Commission on Drug Policy report
argues, some combination of legalization and/or decriminalization of illicit
drugs along with serious harm reduction policies and programs worldwide
may well offer the only realistic formula for reducing the illicit profits that drive
drug-related crime, violence and corruption in Latin America and the Carib-
bean and around the globe, even if addiction rates go up as they did with the end
of US alcohol prohibition in the 1930s (Global Comission on Drug Policy, 2011).
But in the short- and medium-run, Latin American and Caribbean countries will
have to address their own seriously flawed institutions: ending long-standing
corrupt practices; undertaking police, judicial, prison, and other key institutional
reforms; and insuring greater electoral accountability. Such measures are essen-
tial for their own future political stability, democratic consolidation and national
security and cannot wait for global decriminalization or legalization to take place
at some nebulous point in the future. Neither the legalization of marijuana nor
the decriminalization of harder drugs, when and if they ever take place, will con-
stitute panaceas for the resolution of the problems created by proliferating crime,
corruption, and violence throughout the region, for they will not do away with
the many other types of organized crime that operate with virtual impunity in
Latin America and the Caribbean today.
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Resumo/abstract/résumé/resumen
A evolução do tráfico de drogas e do crime organizado na América Latina
Este artigo analisa a evolução da economia ilegal de drogas nas Américas ao longo
das últimas duas décadas. Identifica oito tendências principais que caracterizaram
o tráfico ilícito de drogas e o crime organizado a partir de meados de 2011. São es-
tas: (1) a crescente liberalização do consumo de drogas; (2) as vitórias limitadas e as
consequências não intencionais da “guerra às drogas” liderada pelos Estados Uni-
dos; (3) a proliferação de áreas de cultivo e de rotas de tráfico de droga; (4) a disper-
são e fragmentação dos grupos criminosos organizados; (5) o fracasso da reforma
política e dos esforços de construção do Estado; (6) a insuficiência das políticas do-
mésticas dos EUAde controlo da droga e da criminalidade; (7) a ineficácia das polí-
ticas regionais e internacionais de controlo das drogas; (8) o crescente apoio ao
debate sobre a legalização.
Palavras-chave tráfico de droga, crime organizado, América Latina, guerra contra as
drogas.
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The evolution of drug trafficking and organized crime in Latin America
This article analyses the evolution of illegal drug economy in the Americas over
the past two decades. It identifies eight key trends that have characterized illicit
drug trafficking and organized crime as of mid-2011. They are: (1) the increasing
globalization of drug consumption; (2) the limited victories and unintended con-
sequences of the U.S.-led ‘War on Drugs’; (3) the proliferation of cultivation areas
and of drug smuggling routes; (4) the dispersion and fragmentation of organized
criminal groups; (5) the failure of political reform and state-building efforts; (6)
the inadequacies U.S. domestic drug and crime control policies; (7) the ineffecti-
veness of regional and international drug control policies; (8) the growing sup-
port for legalization debate.
Keywords drug trafficking, organized crime, Latin America, war on drugs.
L’évolution du trafic de drogue et du crime organisé en Amérique latine
Cet article analyse l’évolution de l’économie illégale de la drogue sur le continent
américain au long des vingt dernières années. Il distingue huit tendances principa-
les qui caractérisent le trafic de drogue et le crime organisé à partir du milieu de
l’année 2011, à savoir: (1) la libéralisation croissante de la consommation de dro-
gue; (2) les victoires limitées et les conséquences indésirables de la guerre contre la
drogue menée par les États-Unis; (3) la prolifération de zones de culture et de rou-
tes de trafic de la drogue; (4) la dispersion et l’éclatement des groupes criminels or-
ganisés; (5) l’échec de la réforme politique et des efforts de construction de l’État;
(6) l’insuffisance des politiques internes des États-Unis de contrôle de la drogue et
de la criminalité; (7) l’inefficacité des politiques régionales et internationales de
contrôle de la drogue; (8) le soutien croissant au débat sur la légalisation.
Mots-clés trafic de drogue, crime organisé, Amérique latine, guerre contre la drogue.
La evolución del tráfico de drogas y del crimen organizado en América
Latina
Este artículo analiza la evolución de la economía ilegal de drogas nas Américas a lo
largo de las dos últimas décadas. Identifica ocho tendencias principales que caracte-
rizaron el tráfico ilícito de drogas y el crimen organizado desde mediados de 2011.
Son éstas: (1) la creciente liberalización del consumo de drogas; (2) las victorias limi-
tadas y las consecuencias no intencionadas de la “guerra contra las drogas” liderada
por los Estados Unidos; (3) la proliferación de áreas de cultivo y de rutas de tráfico de
drogas; (4) la dispersión y fragmentación de los grupos criminales organizados; (5) el
fracaso de la reforma política y de los esfuerzos de construcción del Estado; (6) la in-
suficiencia de las políticas internas de los EUAen relción al control de la droga y de la
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criminalidad; (7) la ineficacia de las políticas regionales e internacionales de control
de las drogas; (8) el creciente apoyo al debate sobre la legalización.
Palabras-clave tráfico de droga, crimen organizado, América Latina, guerra contra las
drogas.
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